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THE SEGREGATION OF WHITE AND COLORED
PASSENGERS ON INTERSTATE TRAINS
In the transportation of passengers common carriers are at
liberty to establish rules and regulations for the accommodation
of white and colored passengers. In some States where the
colored population is large, public sentiment demands and
requires a separation of the races, to prevent the breach
of the peace. In order to obtain this security, State
laws are enacted to require common carriers to pro-
vide separate accommodations, which statutes are enforceable
so long as they are confined to intrastate commerce. Laws of
this character are enacted and are binding upon the corporations
engaged in intrastate commerce for the purpose of furthering
the public health, the public morals, the public convenience and
the public order under the terms of the police power of the State,
because there is that natural distinction between passengers of
race and color, which justifies their separation when passengers
on public conveyances. This segregation has been the subject
of sound legislation.
Few persons who tinderstand the cohditions can deny the dan-
ger to the peace engendered by the feeling of aversion between
the individuals of the different races; although this impunity
may not be absolute proof, nevertheless it is the feeling that pre-
vails, and science teaches that it is much easier and more politic to
avert serious consequences than afterwards to punish for the
breach of the peace. This fact has been determined by numerous
decisions. Wherever such statutes have been enacted by the
States they have been held by the Supreme Court of the United
States not to be irregular in requiring separate accommodations
for white and colored passengers, nor in conflict with the provi-
sions of the Thirteenth- and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States.
This matter of discretion is given to the legislature, so that in
determining the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act
with reference to the established usages and customs and tradi-
tions of the people with the intention to preserve the good order
and the public peace. Upon this basis is gauged the standard for
the separation of white and black passengers on intrastate trains,
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which does not involve the question of interstate commerce. The
power to regulate interstate commerce is positively vested in
Congress. but statutes enacted by the States not in conflict with
this power are valid. It seems to be a well settled principle of
the law that common carriers have the right, when no statute
intervenes, to establish such rules and regulations requiring
colored passengers to occupy special coaches or compartments
separate and distinct from those set apart for the white
passengers. Under the powers of the States over the general sub-
ject of commerce it was determined that States may establish
such laws in the absence of legislation by Congress, which en-
actments may embrace the regulation of pilots, quarantine, in-
spection laws, policing of harbors and the regulation of wharves;
also instances of requiring engineers to undergo an examination
of the eyes for color blindness, or defective vision, and obtain a
license from the State board before being permitted to run trains
in the State.' It is within the police power to prescribe that sepa-
rate coaches shall be supplied by carriers within its border for col-
ored passengers. Such State statutes have no application to inter-
state commerce but apply only within the borders of the State.
They cannot be abrogated by a judgment of a Federal court, if it
appears that the Supreme Court of the State has construed and
declared that such enactments are only intended for intrastate
transportation. These enactments are not regulations of interfer-
ence, although they control in some degree the conduct and liabil-
ity of those engaged in interstate commerce, and regulate the rel-
ative duties of persons and corporations within their limits, but
are regarded as legislation in aid of interstate commerce. In M. K.
& T. Ry. v. Haber,2 the learned judge said that "even if
subject of State regulation be one that may be taken
under the exclusive control of Congress and be reached by na-
tional legislation, any action taken by the State upon this subject
that does not directly interfere with rights secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States, or by some valid 'act of Congress.
must be respected until Congress intervenes." The State of
Georgia forbade the running of freight trains on the railroads in
the State on Sundav and declared a violation of the statute to be
a misdemeanor, which enactment was intended for trains tran-
sporting domestic freight within the State. It was not intended
I 154 U. S. 204.
2 169 U. S. 613.
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as an enactment to regulate interstate commerce, and while in'a
limited degree the statute may affect such commerce, it is not
strictly a regulation of it." A State may regulate the speed of
trains within city limits, and such act is, even as to interstate trains,
one only indirectly affecting interstate commerce, and within the
powers of the State, at least until Congress takes action in the mat-
ter.4 A statute was enacted in Louisiana giving equal rights and
privileges to all persons traveling in vessels employed in the trans-
portation of passengers in the State, without discrimination or dis-
tinction as to race or color, but the United States Supreme Court
said that the "State legislature which seeks to impose a
direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly
with its freedom does encroach upon the exclusive power of Con-
gress," and that the statute occupied that position. Such a law
must necessarily influence the conduct of the carrier throughout
its entire business, while only purporting to control the carrier
when engaged within the State. If each State could regulate
the control of carriers while within its. jurisdiction, the confusion
likely to follow could not be otherwise than productive of great
inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. 5
In view of the fact that "Congress has not seen fit to pre-
scribe any specific rules to govern interstate commerce, the
inaction is equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce
shall be free and untrammelled." Under the authorities we find
that Congressional inaction leaves the carrier at liberty to adopt
reasonable rules for the disposition of passengers. The statute
of Louisiana, as construed by the State courts, seems to take from
the carriers this power so long as they are within the State, and
therefore it has been declared void and unconstitutional. The
power of regulation may be exercised without legislation as well
as with legislation. By "refraining from action, Congress. in
effect, adopts as .its own regulations those which the common
law, or the civil law, where that prevails, has provided for the gov-
ernment of such business, and those which the States, in the
regulation of their domestic concerns, have established affecting
commerce. If the public good requires such legislation, it must
come from Congress and not from the States."' ; "By many
3 Hennington v. Ga., 163 U. S. 299
4 Erb v. M1forasch. 177 U. S. 584.
fl1all v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485.
(91 U. S. 282.
95 U. S. 582.
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decisions it has been determined that States have no right to
interfere in the matter of interstate commerce." s A statute of
Mississippi, requiring all railroads carrying passengers in that
State, except street railways, to provide equal but separate ac-
commodations for the white and colored passengers, was held
to be within the powers of the State, and not a regulation of
interstate commerce, as the Supreme Court of that State de-
clared that it applied only to commerce within its borders.
0
Whether interstate passengers of one race should, in any portion
of the journey, be compelled to share their cabin accommodations
with passengers of another race was held to be a question of
interstate commerce, which must be determined by Congress
alone.
The broad question of the right under the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution to segregate white and
colored passengers has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the instance where a negro purchased a ticket
and occupied a vacant seat in the coach where white passengers
were accommodated, and was ejected tinder a separate coach law
of the State of Louisiana. The validity of the statute was
attacked on the ground that it abridged the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens, denying them equal protection of the laws." In
this case Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the statute
of Mississippi was, within the decision in Hall v. DeCuir," a
regulation of commerce among the States and neces-
sarily void. On the contrary it is declared that legislation which
is merely an aid to intrastate commerce may be enacted by a
State although at the same time it may indirectly affect interstate
commerce itself.
The foregoing cases referred to, raise and dispose of the race
question, if under an act its operation applies only to those pas-
sengers traveling from point to point within the State, or re-
quires such passengers to be assigned to separate coaches when
traveling from or to points in other States. Such a law would
apply to intrastate passengers, but if an attempt should be made
to apply it to interstate passengers the construction would un-
doubtedly be declared unconstitutional. A police regulation can-
s I8 U. S. 557.
9 133 U. S. 591.
10 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537.
'1 95 U. S. 485.
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not be so extensive that it becomes national in character. The
Supreme Court will not permit laws which in any way regulate
interstate commerce. A State may make reasonable regulations
to secure the safety of the passengers, even on interstate trains,
while within its borders. But a State cannot enact any regula-
tion which will directly burden or impede the interstate traffic of
the carrier, or impair the usefulness of its facilities for such
traffic.' 2 The failure of Congress to act as to matters of national
character is, as a rule, equivalent to a declaration that they shall
be free from regulation or restriction by any statutory enactment,
and it is well settled that interstate commerce is national in char-
acter. Again, a statute that requires the separation of white and
colored passengers and applies only so far as intrastate transporta-
tion extends is held valid so far as it affects commerce wholly
within the State, but it is invalid as to interstate passengers under
the commerce clause of the constitution and necessarily must be
construed as not applying to them.1 3 The legislation would be an
attempt to exercise a power to regulate commerce directly, but in
case of conflict between the powers claimed by the States and
those which belong exclusively to Congress, the former power
must yield for the Constitution and the laws in pursuance there-
of are the "supreme laws of the land."
Under the commerce act, carriers may place white and colored
passengers in separate cars, but they cannot discriminate in the
accommodations which they furnish to each, which must be sub-
stantially equal in quality and convenience. If it be deemed neces-
sary for the comfort and safety of the passengers, and especially
for the preservation of order by reason of numbers, or the feel-
ing between the races is such as to make it desirable to keep them
separated, the carriers themselves have complete authority to
establish and adopt such regulations on interstate commerce
trains as would relieve them of all the danger and inconvenience
that may arise on account of the two races traveling together. A
colored passenger is denied the right of equal accommodation if
he is unable to obtain a seat in the car set apart for colored pas-
sengers because the car is crowded and the seats are all occupied.' 4
A carrier of passengers by steamboat cannot rightfully exclude
colored passengers from the regular table and require them to
take a seat with the guards in the boat or in a pantry. "But
a colored passenger on a steamboat, who refused to move from
12 I63 U. S. 142.
23 so At. 457.
14 67 S. W. 1085.
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one table to another on being requested to do so, because of
objections to his presence on the part of the white passengers,
and whose supper is duly furnished him, cannot complain of dis-
crimination because, upon his refusal to move, the white passen-
gers are removed to another table, leaving him alone."'"
A negro woman purchased a ticket and entered and occupied a
seat in the car assigned to white passengers, whereupon she was
informed and requested to go forward and occupy a portion of
another car set apart for the people of her race. This she re-
fused to do, so she was removed with only the necessary assis-
tance required for the purpose. In this case the facts showed the
uhdue and unjust discrimination in some particulars of accommo-
dations against the colored passengers.
Carriers may not discriminate between white and colored pas-
sengers, paying the same fare, in the accommodations which they
furnish for each. But when a carrier provides facilities for per-
sonal cleanliness in first-class coaches devoted to the use of white
passengers, and a smoking compartment for the use of such pas-
sengers, also similar accommodations should be provided for
colored passengers paying the same first-class fare.";
Another complaint made before the Interstate Commerce
Commission by a negro for discrimination upon an inter-
state train traveling from Atlanta, Ga., to Washington, D. C.,
charged that carriers did not provide accommodations for
colored passengers equal to those furnished for white pas-
sengers. He purchased first-class tickets and the car oc-
cupied by himself and wife was a compartment car where
smoking was permitted, which was not permitted in those oc-
cupied by the white passengers. The car in which he rode was
partitioned, one portion being marked "colored," to be used by
the negroes, and the other portion marked "white ;" also the toilet
was in improper condition, being out of repair and broken, with
no soap or towels, which condition was somewhat disputed by the
carrier. A case of unjust discrimination was not made clear, and
the Commission said that it was hardly within its power to order
that the carrier must at its peril refrain from causing emergency
conditions or that in the event that such a condition does obtain,
a train must be delayed. The same equipment must be furnished
both races whenever the carrier adopts rules for the separation
1. 37 Fed. Rep. 639.
S012 I. C. C. 284.
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of white and colored passengers, and a discrimination cannot be
made.
People of color ride in Pullman sleeping cars, which car com-
pany does the best it can for their accommodation under the cir-
cumstances. If there is no available space no reservation can be
obtained whether the passenger is white or colored. The right of
a negro to obtain a berth in a Pullman car is not denied on inter-
state trains, if accommodations are available. The right of a
carrier to separate passengers is founded upon two grounds-the
public interest, and the right of private property in the resources
of conveyance. The Pullman company is a common carrier and a
colored passenger who has purchased a first-class ticket has a
right as a matter of law, to obtain a seat in the Pullman car, pro-
vided such accommodations are furnished white passengers who
purchase first-class tickets. Transportation companies may be
subjected to public control in the interest of the public con-
venience and comfort, and if separate accommodations are gen-
erally demanded and not unreasonably burdensome, they may be
compelled by law.
Social conditions which form a basis for discrimination are
undoubtedly understood best by those persons living in the locali-
ties inhabited by a dense black population in Southern or South-
western States. The people of the Eastern and Northern
States are unaccustomed to the black element and in these sec-
tions of the country the color line is not closely drawn. In an
instance of discrimination in Pennsylvania, a judge declared that
it was near time that prejudice should be removed and social con-
ditions be equal for transportation, but it may safely be said that
he had little social relations with the colored race. Socially, the
colored race is inferior to the white, but the law recognizes the
colored man otherwise by numerous judicial decisions, or he
would very soon lose his legal status.
We have seen that State statutes against the intermingling of
white and colored passengers are valid in so far as they are con-
strued and applied to intrastate transportation, but such statutes
cannot interfere with interstate trains carrying passengers be-
tween interstate points. This separation can be accomplished by
the carriers when they establish and adopt regulations necessary
for the purpose of separation, which rules they are at liberty
to enforce. Such regulations would be upheld as a special pri-
vilege of the carriers. A Federal statute is necessary to compel
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interstate carriers to separate colored and white passengers, and
if such legislation could be accomplished the separation of the
races in transportation would be a worthy regulation of com-
merce. In the absence of such Federal legislation, a similar
regulation adopted by the carriers themselves would be most
gratifying, and it would be regarded with favor not only by the
white, but also by the colored race.
J. Newton Baker.
District of Columbia Bar.
